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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




On October 16, 1996, Appellant Electrodyne Systems 
Corporation ("Electrodyne") plead guilty, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, to Counts Two and Ten of an Indictment. 
Counts Two and Ten charged Electrodyne with 
impermissibly exporting defense related equipment in 
violation of 22 U.S.C. SS 2778(b)(2) and (c) and 18 U.S.C. 
S 2, and with making a false statement, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 1001 and S 2, respectively. Electrodyne appeals the 
imposition of a one million dollar fine payable immediately 
as part of the sentence imposed on May 27, 1997. 
Electrodyne asserts five grounds in support of its appeal: 
 
       1. The district court failed to consider or make 
       findings with respect to Electrodyne's ability to pay 
       a million dollar fine. 
 
       2. The district court failed to make findings where 
       matters were disputed in the presentence report, as 
       required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
       32(c)(1). 
 
       3. The district court improperly calculated the 
       applicable guideline fine range on Count Ten, 
       making a false statement, for two reasons. 
 
          1) The district court failed to determ ine accurately 
       the amount of loss under Sentencing Guideline 
       S 8C2.3(a). 
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          2) The district court erroneously applied a 50 or 
       more employee enhancement under Sentencing 
       Guideline S 8C2.5(b)(4). 
        
       4. The district court, during the plea colloquy, 
       understated the maximum fine to which 
       Electrodyne was exposed on Count Ten. 
 
       5. The district court ordered the fine payable 
       immediately when the plea agreement provided 
       Electrodyne should have six months to pay any 
       fine. 
 
Electrodyne has asserted it is entitled to withdraw its 
plea if it prevails on grounds four or five. However, it has 
stated that it will not pursue points four or five above if it 
succeeds in obtaining its requested relief on thefirst two 
grounds for appeal. Electrodyne requests that this court 
direct the district court to make detailed findings with 
respect to Electrodyne's ability to pay and then to impose a 
fine that does not exceed $140,000 and that is not due for 
six months. The government has conceded a remand for 
resentencing on the fine is necessary on grounds one, two 
and three. However, the government contests Electrodyne's 
proposed directions that the fine may not exceed $140,000 
and should be payable over the course of six months. 
Because we conclude the proposed directive should not be 
given, it is necessary to review grounds four andfive and 
determine whether on remand defendant should be afforded 
the opportunity to withdraw its plea. 
 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The district court had jurisdiction over the conviction and 
sentence below under 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. 
The first, second, third and fifth grounds for appeal are 
subject to plenary review. See United States v. Demes, 941 
F.2d 220, 223-224 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Furst, 
918 F.2d 400, 406 (3d Cir. 1990); see generally United 
States v. Gilchrist, 130 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 1997). The fourth 
ground for appeal is reviewed for harmless error. See United 
States v. De le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1005 (1985). 
 




Withdrawal of Plea 
 
A. District Court's Incorrect Advice as to the Maximum 
       Statutory Fine for the Offense of Making a False 
       Statement During Plea Allocation 
 
The court's erroneous advice regarding the maximum 
statutory fine occurred during the taking of a Rule 11 plea. 
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. When taking the plea, the district 
judge, apparently misled by the plea agreement, see DA 53, 
and the government's plea memorandum, see DA 62, 
advised defendant's representative with respect to Count 
Ten, the false statement count, 18 U.S.C. S 1001, that "the 
maximum fine is the greatest of $10,000 or twice the gain 
or twice the loss." DA 77. In fact, the correct maximum 
statutory fine on the false statement count was the greatest 
of $500,000 or twice the loss or twice the gain caused by 
the offense. See 18 U.S.C. SS 3559(a)(4), 3571 (c) and (d).1 
 
The government concedes the district judge erroneously 
informed Electrodyne as to the maximum fine on Count 
Ten; however, the government asserts the error was 
harmless because the court correctly advised the defendant 
that the maximum fine on Count Two, an Arms Export 
Control Act violation, 22 U.S.C. S 2778, was"$1 million or 
twice the gain or twice the loss." DA 77. The government 
then argues that because the defendant corporation was 
advised the maximum total fine which could be imposed 
was $1,010,000 and defendant was fined one millions 
dollars, the error was harmless. 
 
In support of its position, Defendant relies primarily on 
United States v. Herrold, 635 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1980), for 
the proposition that "failure to instruct defendant of the 
actual maximum sentence before the submission of a guilty 
plea violates Rule 11(c)(1)," id. at 215, and affords grounds 
for withdrawal of a plea under Rule 32(e) (formerly Rule 
32(b)). See id. at 216. See also Kelsey v. United States, 484 
F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that defense counsel's 
informing a defendant the maximum penalty was more 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The presentence report erroneously listed the maximum fine as 
$250,000. 
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than the statute allowed resulted in the plea not being 
knowing or voluntarily and necessitated withdrawal of the 
plea). The Herrold court reviewed the proceeding below 
under an abuse of discretion standard, see 635 F.2d at 
215, while the Kelsey court was silent as to the standard of 
review it employed. 
 
With the amendment to Rule 11 and its codification of a 
harmless error standard of review in 1983, however, our 
decisional law has changed. In De le Puente, we held it was 
harmless error to fail to advise defendant that if the court 
did not accept the government's recommendation, the 
defendant nevertheless could not withdraw his plea. See 
755 F.2d at 315. Although our decision in United States v. 
Hawthorne, 806 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1986), would seemingly 
support defendant's position, closer analysis demonstrates 
that Hawthorne left the holding of De le Puente unmarred. 
In Hawthorne, a restitution order was held invalid after the 
district court failed to inform the defendant during the plea 
colloquy that restitution could be ordered in excess of the 
loss attributable to the counts to which defendant pleaded 
guilty. See id. at 499. Nevertheless, the Hawthorne court 
did not order that defendant have the opportunity to 
withdraw the plea. See id. at 499-500. Instead, Hawthorne 
remanded for resentencing because the district court could 
remedy the error by imposing either the allowable amount 
of restitution or a fine exceeding that amount and still be 
in accordance with the plea agreement. See id. at 499-501. 
 
When all is said and done, the immutable fact is 
Electrodyne was advised its maximum fine exposure was 
$1,010,000, when in fact the maximum fine exposure was 
$1,500,000. Defendant was fined $1 million, an amount 
below the exposure about which it was informed. Under 
this circumstance, the error must be characterized as 
harmless. Defendant will not be permitted to withdraw its 
plea on this ground. 
 
B. District Court's Refusal to Allow Defendant a Period of 
       Six Months in Which to Pay the Fine 
 
The parties plea agreement contained a "Stipulations" 
section which provided in pertinent part: 
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       This Office and Electrodyne agree to stipulate at 
       sentencing to the statements set forth in the attached 
       Schedule A, which hereby is made a part of this plea 
       agreement. This agreement to stipulate, however, 
       cannot and does not bind the sentencing judge, which 
       [sic] may make independent factual findings and may 
       reject any or all of the stipulations entered into by the 
       parties. . . . 
 
DA 54-55. Pursuant to the "Stipulations" provision, the 
government and Electrodyne agreed $140,000 was an 
appropriate fine, see DA 58-59, PP 4 and 5, and "that the 
fine should be paid no later than six months after the date 
of sentencing." DA 59, P 5. Electrodyne agrees with the 
district court that the stipulation was not binding. See DA 
85. That would seemingly end the matter but for the 
language of the plea agreement itself. 
 
The plea agreement independent of the attached 
"Stipulations" provides: 
 
       . . . The parties agree that the fine imposed by the 
       sentencing court may be paid within six months of the 
       date of sentencing and that the timely payment of the 
       fine shall be made a special condition of organizational 
       probation. . . . 
 
DA 53-54. Electrodyne argues in effect that the six month 
provision for payment of the fine was part of a specific 
sentence which, if not followed by the district court, 
required an opportunity to withdraw the plea. The 
weakness in defendant's position is threefold. First, the 
same provision for a six month delay in the payment of the 
fine is contained in the Stipulations section which 
Electrodyne concedes is not binding on the court. Second, 
the very next paragraph of the plea agreement makes clear 
the sentence to be imposed is within the sole discretion of 
the sentencing judge: 
 
       The sentence to be imposed upon Electrodyne is within 
       the sole discretion of the sentencing judge. This Office 
       cannot and does not make any representation or 
       promise as to what guideline range will be found 
       applicable to Electrodyne, or as to what sentence 
       Electrodyne ultimately will receive. . . . 
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DA 54. Finally, the district judge advised Electrodyne that 
in the event the penalty was more severe than that 
anticipated by the defendant, the plea could not be 
withdrawn. See DA 85. Accordingly, the rejection of the six 
month provision and the order of immediate payment was 
simply an example of a more severe penalty that was 
"within the sole discretion of the sentencing judge." Id. 
 
We hold that neither the district court's incorrect advice 
as to the maximum penalty on the false statement count 
nor its refusal to allow the fine to be paid within six months 
of sentencing provides a ground for withdrawal of 
Electrodyne's plea. Because withdrawal of the plea will not 
be ordered, this Court must address the failure of the 
district judge to make a finding on Electrodyne's ability to 
pay a fine, the district court's failure to comply with Rule 
32(c)(1) and the district court's determination of the fine 
guideline range. Each will be briefly discussed. 
 
Vacating the Sentence 
 
A. Necessity of Findings on Ability to Pay a Fine 
 
Electrodyne asserts that on remand, our order that the 
district court make a finding on Electrodyne's ability to pay 
should be accompanied by a directive that any fine imposed 
should not exceed $140,000. In support of this assertion, 
Electrodyne correctly states that the stipulation between it 
and the government provided the fine should not exceed 
$140,000, see DA 58-59, and that the government affirmed 
its agreement at the sentencing hearing. See DA 143. 
 
In further support of its position, Electrodyne argues the 
presentence report "confirmed Electrodyne's inability to pay 
more than the stipulated fine," Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 2, 
and that by adopting the factual findings of the presentence 
report the district court so found. While we agree the 
district court adopted the factual findings of the 
presentence report, see DA 153, by signing the "Judgment 
in a criminal case,"2 DA 149-153, we cannot accept that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The "Judgment in a criminal case" is the formal judgment entered 
against a criminal defendant. On that form, there is a box that can be 
checked stating: "The court adopts the factualfindings and guideline 
application in the presentence report." DA 153. This box was checked in 
the instant case. See id. We are not unaware that the mark may have 
been clerical error; nonetheless, we must assume it is an accurate 
reflection of the district court's position. 
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probation officer adopted any factual position with respect 
to the financial condition of Electrodyne. 
 
A constant problem faced by a district court in 
establishing fines is that the defendant controls what 
information flows to the probation office. The problem is 
exacerbated both by the fact that probation officers rarely 
have training in accounting and by defendant's status as a 
corporation, which enables defendant to choose to be less 
than forthcoming because, by definition, a corporation 
cannot be incarcerated. That is exactly what happened in 
this case: 
 
       At the request of the probation office, the corporate 
       defendant has provided corporate income tax returns 
       for the last three fiscal years. Electrodyne does not 
       have audited financial statements for the past three 
       years; however, provided [sic] a financial statement 
       with the accountant's compilation for the year end 
       December 31, 1994. A compilation is limited to 
       presenting in the form of financial statements 
       information that is the representation of management. 
       The accountant did not audit or review the 
       accompanying financial statements and, 
       accordingly, does not express an opinion or any 
       other form of assurance on them. Management 
       elected to omit substantially all of the disclosures 
       and the statement of cash flows required by 
       generally accepted accounting principles. If the 
       omitted disclosures and statement of cash flows 
       were included in the financial statements, they 
       might influence the user's conclusion about the 
       Company's financial position, results of operations, 
       and cash flows. Accordingly, these financial 
       statements are not designed for those who are not 
       informed about such matters. 
 
Presentence report at 27, P 138 (emphasis added). 
 
The accountant expressly declined to render an opinion 
or to find any assurance of the accuracy of Electrodyne's 
financial statements and noted the defendant declined to 
supply other documentation. In effect, the accountant was 
saying the financial information supplied by Electrodyne 
 
                                8 
  
was insufficient to make a determination. Given the facts 
contained in the presentence report, we hold the probation 
officer made no factual finding on ability to pay a fine. 
Given that state of affairs, we decline to direct the district 
judge to impose a fine not exceeding $140,000. 
 
We do not believe the district judge must be a puppet 
dancing to whatever financial disclosure strings a 
defendant corporation wishes to pull. We can think of no 
reason why the district judge does not have the power to 
require production of necessary financial documents so as 
to have a basis in fact for any fine which is to be imposed. 
Should the defendant corporation fail to producefinancial 
documentation requested by the probation office and/or the 
court, the necessity for the district judge to have a basis in 
fact for establishing the amount of fine is reduced. 
Similarly, the sentencing judge is not controlled by, but 
may accept, a fine amount negotiated by the corporate 
defendant and the government. If the judge accepts the 
negotiated fine, no detailed finding of ability to pay is 
necessary because the defendant has implicitly 
acknowledged its ability by virtue of the agreement. 
 
Section 3572(a)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code 
mandates that when a court imposes a fine and determines 
"the amount, time for payment and method of payment," 
the court must consider, inter alia, "the defendant's 
income, ensuring capacity and financial resources." 
Further, it is well settled in this circuit that"[t]he district 
court must make findings regarding a defendant's ability to 
pay a fine." United States v. Seale, 20 F.3d 1279, 1284 (3d 
Cir. 1994). "Where the court has created enough of a 
factual record that it is clear that it considered a 
defendant's ability to pay, its findings may be deemed 
adequate." Id. at 1284. Here the district judge failed to 
make any findings pertaining to imposition of afine. 
Without factual findings there can be no meaningful 
appellate review. Ordinarily, we would only vacate the fine 
portion of the sentence and remand for resentencing. 
However, as discussed in Section B below, the entire 
sentence must be vacated. Therefore, we will vacate and 
remand with instructions to make factual findings on both 
the ability to pay a fine and the time within which the fine 
can be paid. 
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B. The District Court's Reliance Upon Disputed Matters 
 
Rule 32(c)(1) requires that with respect to each disputed 
matter the court "must make either a finding on the 
allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary 
because the controverted matter will not be taken into 
account in, or will not affect, sentencing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32(c)(1). A finding on a disputed fact or a disclaimer of 
reliance upon a disputed fact must be expressly made. See 
United States v. Murello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1317 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Furst, 918 F.2d at 408. Further, the Rule requires that the 
findings and determinations be appended to a copy of the 
presentence report. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1). This Rule 
is strictly enforced and failure to comply with it is grounds 
for vacating the sentence. See Furst, 918 F.2d at 408; U.S. 
v. Blanco, 884 F.2d 1577, 1580-1582 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Electrodyne asserts it made numerous objections to the 
presentence report and the district court neither made 
findings regarding the disputed issues nor expressly 
disclaimed reliance on the disputed matters. The 
government concedes the record supports this allegation. 
After Electrodyne's objections, see DA 131-134, were 
articulated to the district court, see DA 136-141, the court 
rejected some of the objections and then stated,"Now, the 
other objections do not affect the guideline. *** They don't 
affect my determination as to sentencing." DA 141. 
However, the judgment order noted that the court 
"adopt[ed] the factual findings and guideline application in 
the presentence report." DA 153. At best, the record is 
ambiguous as to the district court's reliance upon the 
disputed matters; at worst, the record reflects a direct 
conflict with Rule 32(c)(1)'s mandate. 
 
Electrodyne's sentence will be vacated and the case will 
be remanded for resentencing consistent with Rule 32(c)(1). 
 
C. The District Court's Calculation of the Applicable 
       Guideline Fine Range for Count 10 
 
Electrodyne argues the district court incorrectly assessed 
the total loss figure used to determine the base fine 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 8C2.3 and S 8C2.4. More 
specifically, the court allegedly equated the stipulated 
restitution with a stipulated loss when, in fact, the 
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restitution was not an accurate reflection of the loss. In 
addition, Electrodyne asserts the court erroneously found 
the corporation had 50 or more employees, which increased 
the fine range under U.S.S.G. S 8C2.5(b)(4). The government 
agrees that the district court did not make sufficient 
findings to afford meaningful appellate review. 
 
Although the parties do not characterize this ground for 
appeal as a failure to comply with Rule 32(c)(1), it is 
apparent that such a problem has been presented. 
Electrodyne challenged the presentence report's calculation 
of the loss as the same figure to which the parties 
stipulated for restitution. See Presentence report at 19, 
P 108; DA 137-141. Electrodyne explained to the district 
court that the restitution amount inflated the amount of 
loss because some of the loss figures were double counted 
and some of the restitution was being paid in kind rather 
than in money. See DA 137-141. The court responded, "I'm 
not buying into the argument. The fact of the matter is if 
this figure is good enough for restitution, and Ifind it is, 
it's good enough to make a loss, an analogy as [sic] 
appropriate loss figure." DA 141. Not only is this finding on 
the disputed issue of loss not appended to a copy of the 
presentence report but the nature of the finding also 
precludes meaningful appellate review of the issue. The 
conclusory statement that restitution and loss are 
equatable does not sufficiently address the points raised by 
defendant so as to constitute a finding or determination as 
required by Rule 32. 
 
The issue of whether Electrodyne satisfied the "50 or 
more employees" basis for increasing the culpability score 
underlying the fine range presents a similar problem. 
U.S.S.G. S 8C2.5(b)(4). The presentence report stated that 
Electrodyne had "approximately 50 people," presentence 
report at 26, P 134, but Electrodyne argued to the district 
court that its workforce consisted of fewer than 50 
employees on average and only at times reached 50. See DA 
136-137. Electrodyne asserted that the guideline provision 
should be based on the average number of employees and, 
therefore, should not be applied to Electrodyne. See id. The 
government did not take a position on the issue and the 
court stated, "I'll rule against you on that." DA 137. This 
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summary dismissal of Electrodyne's argument is 
insufficient to offer this Court a basis for review. 
 
At a minimum, the district court must offer a factual 
basis for rejecting Electrodyne's assertion that its workforce 
did not satisfy the criterion, including a factual finding as 
to the number of days Electrodyne had 50 or more 
employees in whatever the district court determines is the 
relevant time period. The presentence report's statement 
that "approximately 50" people were employed by 
Electrodyne cannot serve as a basis for finding that the "50 
or more" criterion was actually met. Accordingly, upon 
remand, the court shall make findings pursuant to Rule 
32(c)(1) on the amount of loss and the number of employees 
for the purpose of determining Electrodyne's fine. 
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